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NOTES
State Administrative Procedure-Scopeof
JudicialReview
THE PAST decade has seen the birth and growth of activities in many
states to make uniform the procedural processes of the various state administrative tribunals. In several jurisdictions,' including Ohio, 2 this development has ripened into a single comprehensive legislative enactment

resembling the Model State Administrative Procedure Act.8 In other states
'Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. H§ 536.100 and 536.140 (1949); Wisconsin,
Wis. STAT. §§ 227.01 to 227.26 (1947).
For a general discussion of state legislation in this field see Administrative Procedure Legislation in the States, Petrel Heady, Michigan Governmental Studies No.
24 (1952).
-Oio GENERAL CODE § 154-61 to 154-74 (1946).
'The text of the Model Act is found in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 329 (1944); it is reprinted
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no such thorough legislative treatment has been attempted, but some statutory procedure has been established to govern various phases of administrative procedure. In some of these states such areas of agency activity as
licensing have been brought under the directives of a single uniform act;4 in
others, only the procedure for appeal from agency decisions to the courts
has been uniformly established by statute.5 It is the purpose of this comment to discuss and compare the scope of the judicial review of agency
adjudications allowed under the appellate provisions of all of these statutes.
Each act provides in some way for judicial review of agency fact finding; ordinarily one of the grounds of appeal is that the agency's findings of
fact are not supported by the evidence.8 Most of the acts provide that the
appeal is to be upon a transcript of the record made before the agency and
certified by it to the reviewing court.7 The question then arises: Is the
reviewing court, in considering the record, to weigh for itself the evidence
in order to decide whether to affirm or reverse the agency's findings of fact?
in 33 IOWA L. REV. 372 (1948), and also in GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

-- CAsEs AND COmmENTS 1119 (2d ed. 1947).
In states which have not undertaken to reform the procedure for appeal from
administrative adjudications, the procedure for each agency is usually found among
the statutes governing procedure for that particular agency. Thus, in those states,
the practice varies considerably from agency to agency.
'California, CAL. Civ. CODE § 1094.5 (1949); Indiana, IND. ANN. STAT. § 601501 to 60-1511, §§ 63-3001 to 63-3030 (Bums 1933); North Carolina, N.C.
GENq. STAT. ANN. §H 143-195 to 143-198, § 150-1 to 150-7 (1943); North Dakota, N.D. R.y. CODE H9 28-3201 to 28-3222 (1943); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT.
ANN. ut. 71, §§ 1710.1 to 1710.51 (1942); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. H9 54-2 to
54-19 (1950).
5
lllinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 110 §§ 264 to 279 (1948); New Hampshire, N.H.
Rav. LAWS c. 414, H9 1 to 22 (1942); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 9008 to
9018 (Williams 1934)
'California, § 1094.5(b) (appeal on ground of "abuse of discretion," and that
phrase defined to include cases in which "the order or decision is not supported by
the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence."); Illinois, § 273
(appeal extends "to all questions of law and fact", administrative findings are
"prima face true and correct."); Indiana, § 63-3018(5); Missouri, § 536.140 (2)
(3); New Hampshire, § 13 (burden of proof on appellant to show that the agency
decision is "dearly unreasonable", all findings of the agency deemed "prima facw
lawful and reasonable."); North Dakota, § 28-3219; Pennsylvania, § 1710.44; Tennessee, § 9014 (by implication, since the appeal is de novo on the record); Virginia,
§ 54-16(5); Wisconsin, § 227.20(1)(d). North Carolina and Ohio specify no
grounds of appeal; but in the former state the appellant is entitled to a trial by jury
in the reviewing court of the matter which was before the agency, and in the latter
state it is sufficient that the appellant is "adversely affected by any order of an
agency issued pursuant to an adjudication." Ohio, § 154-73.
'California, § 1094.5 (a) and 109 4 .5(c); Illinois, §§ 272(b) and 274; Indiana,
§ 63-3018; Missouri, H9 536140(1); New Hampshire, § 14; North Carolina,
§ 150-4; North Dakota, § 28-3219; Ohio, § 154-73; Pennsylvania, § 1710.44; Virginia, § 54-16(5); Wisconsin, § 227.20(1) Tennessee, § 9014, provides: "The
hearing shall be on the proof
in the transcript and upon such other evidence as
"
either party may desire to introduce;
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To give the reviewing court uncontrolled independence in according
weight to the evidence in the record would in effect make the agency a
mere examiner for the court, a result which nullifies the very purposes for
which administrative agencies are said to have been established." Therefore,
most of the state procedure acts have attempted to lay down some standard
whereby the court is limited in its power to give its independent considerationf While these various statutes are intrinsically quite similar the courts
have taken divergent views in construing these limitations upon their
powers of review.
Under the usual provision, the court is to decide whether the agency
decision is supported by "substantial evidence."10 The natural effect of
such criterion is to require that the court examine the record in order to
determine if the evidence is "substantial," and this would seem to indicate
a process of weighing. Courts, however, have not always reasoned in this
way. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has ruled under its review statute
that:
on a review based upon the record the court does not retry the case.

It is the duty of the trial [reviewing] court to examine the record sufficiently to determine whether the [constitutional] rights of the petioner

have been invaded by an error of the commission'
This court expressly adopted the federal interpretation, as it then existed,
of similar statutory language.1 2 While Wisconsin still apparently follows
"This justification of administrative law is a common one, expressed by many writers
on the subject. See, e.g., DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, c. 1 (1951).
*These provisions are discussed infra.
"iCalifornia, § 1094.5 (c) ("substantial evidence" if the court is not authorized to
use its independent judgment); Indiana, § 63-3018 ("substantial, reliable, and probative evidence"); Missouri, § 536.140(2) ("competent and substantial evidence");
North Dakota, § 28-3219 ("the evidence"); Pennsylvania, § 1710A4 ("substantial
evidence"); Virginia, § 54-16 ("substantial aid reliable evidence"); Wisconsin, §
227.20(d) ("substantial evidence"). North Carolina has no specific provision.
The Ohio statute, as amended, is discussed snfa.
Two states make "preponderance" the test Both of these states also use a negatAve approach, requiring affirmance unless the agency decision is unreasonable or unlawful by the designated quantum of evidence. New Hampshire, § 13 ("dear preponderance of the evidence"); Tennessee, § 9014, as amended 1951 ("preponderance of the proof").
'Gateway City Transfer Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 253 Wis. 397, 409, 34
N.W.2d 238, 244 (1948). The case contains an excellent discussion of the meaning of "substantial evidence," adhering to the view that a "substantial evidence" provision precludes the idea of weighing the evidence. For an Ohio case similar to this
case, see Farrand v. State Medical Board, 151 Ohio St. 222, 85 NXE.2d 113 (1949),
discussed infra.
' The United States Supreme Court evolved an interpretation of the phrase "substantial evidence" as it was used in the National Labor Relations Act. The Supreme
Court view seems to have culminated in Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305
U.S. 197, 59 Sup. Ct. 206 (1938), which gave rise to the rule that the reviewing
court, in examining for substantial evidence, is to review only the evidence favorable
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this view, 3 it is noteworthy that the United States Supreme Court has since
modified its former rule.'4
In Missouri a somewhat less restricted interpretation has been placed
upon the "substantial evidence' provision, which in that state is guaranteed
by constitutional provision' 5 as weU as by statute.'6 While the Supreme
Court in that state has said that the Court is only to "set aside decisions
dearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of evidence,"'17 this result is
more liberal in permitting court review than the Wisconsin view, for great
stress is placed by the Missouri courts on the fact that the court is to review
the enttre record.'

Although the Illinois statute is broader than Missouri's, the rules evolved
by the courts of the two states for the scope of judicial review are similar.
to the agency's determination. See Stason, "SubstantialEvnience" sn Administatve
Procedure, 89 U. OF PA. L REv. 1026 (1941). The doctrine has been amplified
in more recent cases, among which are N.LR.B. v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 59 Sup. Ct. 501 (1939), and Nevada Consolidated Copper
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 316 U.S. 105, 62 Sup. Ct. 960 (1942). For discussion of these
cases see Note, 39 ILL. B.J. 608 (1951); for a discussion of the "substantial evidence rule" adopted under the Labor-Management Relations Act see COOPER, ADmISTRATivB AGENCiES AND THE COURTS 330-350 (1951); DAVIS, ADMINISTRATVE LAW cc. 19 and 20 (1951).

The same interpretation of "substantial evidence" as under the Wagner Act has
been placed upon the phrase where it is found in other statutes, and has become the
standard interpretation used in the federal courts. See, e.g., Gray v. Powell, 314
U.S. 402, 62 Sup. Ct. 326 (1941), discussed in DAVIS, ADMINiSTRATIVE LAW 882
(1951). See generally, COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS

(1951)
' See Hoyt, The Wisconsi Adminstrate ProcedureAct, [1944] WIs. L REv. 214,
234; compare Luce, The Wisconstn Idea in Adminfstrative Law, 34 MARQ. L. REV.
1, 14 (1950).
' The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 237 et seq., 5 U.S.C. § 1001
et seq. (1946), provides in § 10(e) for the substantial evidence test, in language
differing only slightly from that of the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Law. In
Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 487, 71 Sup. Ct. 463 (1951), the
Supreme Court, construing the APA and the Taft-Hartley Act together, indicated
that full effect is to be given to the entire record by the reviewing court, and decidedly broadened the scope of review under its former decisions. See Comment,
[1951] U. OF ILL. L. FORuM 166.

But see DAVIS, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW 871-2

(1951). The writers are not in agreement as to the present scope of judical review
as established by the Supreme Court. Compare, e.g., Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evuence on the Whole Record," 64 HARV. L REV. 1233 (1951) with Netterville, The Admnst'atrwe Procedure Act: A Study m Interpretaton, 20 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1 (1951).
Mo. CONST., Art. V, § 22 (1945), provides that decisions of administrative
agencies must be "supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole
record."
"'Missouri, § 536.140(2).
' TWood v. Wagner Electric Corp., 355 Mo. 670, 674, 197 S.W.2d 647, 649
(1946), construing the constitutional provision cited in note 15 supra.
'Wood v. Wagner Electric Corp., note 17 supra; Seabaugh v. Garver Lumber Manufacturing Co., 355 Mo. 1153, 200 S.W.2d 55 (1947). But in Karch v. Empire
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The Illinois statute extends the scope of review to "all questions of law
and of fact presented by the entire record before the court."1 While agency
findings are, by the same statute, made "prima facie true and correct" the
court is nonetheless to review the proceedings on the record, and is to
reverse the decision of the agency if it is "manifestly against the weight
20
of the evidence."
Several states have adopted a still more liberal view, allowing an appeal
which is characterized as "de novo on the record." North Dakota has reasoned
that since the appeal from the reviewing court to an appellate court is, by
statute, de novo on the record, then the appeal from an administrative
agency to the reviewing court must likewise be de novo on the record. 21 In
California, by reason of constitutional interpretaon, 22 the court is to weigh
the evidence for itself -a trial de novo on the record -in the case of
appeals from decisions of state-wide agencies.23 A New Hampshire case
shows the most interesting approach. In that state the procedure act allows
District Electric Co., 358 Mo. 1062, 218 S.W.2d 765 (1949), an inference drawn
by the agency and based upon circumstantial evidence was held to comply with the
constitutional requirement, and in Scott v. Wheelock Bros., Inc., 357 Mo. 480, 209
S.W.2d 149 (1948), circumstantial evidence was also held sufficient. The Karch
case contains the following statement of the Missouri position:
If the Commission's findings and award are supported by competent and
substantial evidence upon the whole record, we may not go further and
substitute our own judgment for that of the Commission. [Emphasis
supplied].
358 Mo. 1062, 1069, 218 S.W.2d 765, 769 (1949).
" Illinois, § 274.
The wording of this statute is to be explained by the fact that
earlier Illinois constitutional decisions have denied the power of the legislature to
limit the courts' power to review agency fact finding. See Ots Elevator Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 302 Ill.
90, 134 N.E. 19 (1922). However, the court may itself
limit the scope of the review of fact finding. See Sullivan, Judicial Review in Ilinots, [1949] U. oF ILL. L FORUM 304, 317; Dodd, An Appraisal of Illinots Adminsstratwe Procedure Today, [1949] U. oF ILL. L. FORUM 181.
2' Local No. 658, Boot and Shoe Workers Union v. Brown Shoe Co., 403 Ill. 484,
491, 87 N.E.2d 625, 630 (1949). In Drezner v. Civil Service Comm'n, 398 IM1.
219, 227, 75 N.E.2d 303, 307 (1947), the court said:
While the Administrative Review Act does not purport to give a reviewing court the right to reweigh the evidence in the cause appealed from,
still the courts have the power
to consider the record to determine
whether or not the findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
See also Brown Shoe Co. v. Gordon, 405 II 384, 91 N.E. 2d 381 (1950); Oswald
v. Civil Service Comm'n, 406 Ill.
506, 94 N.E.2d 311 (1950). See Note [1951]
U. OF ILL. L FORUM 166, 168.
'Inre Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 74 N.D. 416, 23 N.W.2d 49 (1946). Cf. National Farmers Union Life Ass'n v. Krueger, 38 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1949).
:*Standard Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization, 6 Cal.2d 557, 59 P.2d 119 (1936)
(state-wide agencies may not perform judical acts, but local agencies may do so, under the California Constitution); see Clarkson, Administrative law and Procedure,
3 ANNUAL SURVEY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 5 (1951).
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the admission, in certain cases, of additional evidence in the reviewing
court.2 4 It has been held that since in those cases the court must necessarily
weigh the evidence for itself, it follows that the legislature intended the
court to weigh the evidence independently in any appeal, even though
solely upon the record.25 Such a construction, it should be noted, would
be open to several of the states which have similar provisions for the admis26
sion of additional testimony.
The courts of three of the states have thus far avoided any problems in
the construction of the scope of review provisions. The following language
of the North Carolina statute apparently establishes the "de novo on the
record" idea, at least if timely motion for a jury trial is made by the appellant:
The person whose license is involved shall upon his appeal have the
right to a trial by jury of the issues of fact arising on the pleadings, but
such trial shall be only upon the written evidence taken before the trial
committee or counsel.'

The Indiana review provision requires the court to make written findings of
29
fact,28 but further provides that:
On such judicial review such court shall not try or determine said
cause de novo, but the facts shall be considered and determined exclusively
upon the record filed with said court pursuant to this act.

This secures the right of the reviewing judge to weigh the evidence independently, though restricted to the record. Tennessee merely provides that
the court shall "weigh the evidence and determine the facts."3° Since in
that state any party may, on appeal, introduce new evidence not heard by
the board, 3 it would seem to follow that the judge could give his independent consideration to the evidence in the record.
" Moran v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Cal.2d 301, 196 P.2d 20 (1948).
But cf. Southern California Jockey Club, Inc. v. California Horse Racing Board, 36
Cal.2d 167, 223 P.2d 1 (1950).
' New Hampshire, § 14.
' 3Grafton County Electric Light & P. Co. v. State, 77 N.H. 490, 93 Ad. 1028
(1915). Accord, State v. Hampton Water Works Co., 91 N.H. 278, 18 A.2d 765
(1941).
' If additional evidence be allowed, the court may hear it in the following jurisdictions: California, § 1094.5 (d) (when the court is otherwise authorized to give to
the record its independent judgment); Indiana, § 1140.110(g) (similar to Califorma); New Hampshire, § 14; Ohio, § 154-73; Tennessee, § 9014; Virginia, § 5416(5).
In Farrand v. State Medical Board, 151 Ohio St. 222, 85 N.E.2d 113 (1949),
discussed snfra, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected a similar argument brought under
the Ohio act, § 15473.

'North Carolina, § 150-4.
Indiana, § 63-3018.

Ibu.
'Tennessee, § 9014, as amended 1951.
"lbod.
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In Ohio the scope of review is as yet uncertain. Ohio General Code
Section 154-73 provides for appeals from administrative adjudications to
32
the courts of common pleas in the following language:
Unless otherwise provided by law, in the hearing of the appeal the
court shall be confined to the record as certified to it by the agency
The court shall conduct a hearing on such appeal
The hearing
shall proceed as in the trial of a civil action, and the court shall determine
the rights of the parties in accordance with the statutes applicable to such
action

It is dear from the first part of the above provision that the review is to
be on the record.33
This section was first construed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in
Farrandv. State Mfedical Board,34 in which a limited practitioner of medicine
had appealed from a Board ruling revoking his license to practice. The
licensee had contended that the provision of Section 154-73 making the
cavil procedure statutes applicable meant that the court should independently weigh the evidence in the record. The Supreme Court, however,
dismissed this notion by construing that provision to apply only as to new
evidence admitted upon review. 5 Of the legislative intent in providing
for judicial review, the Court said:
the General Assembly did not intend that a court should substitute
its judgment for that of the specially created board or commission but did

intend to confer a revisory jurisdiction [only]

as

It is clear that the Court meant to exclude entirely the possibility of a de

novo review of any kind, and even to avoid the test of "substantial evidence,"
for the Court said:
the General Assembly
has limted such right [of appeal] to an
appeal for a review of the administrative procedure to ascertain whether the
rights of the parties have been determined by the administrative agency

'Ortio GENmzAL CODE § 154-73, as amended by 124 Ohio Laws § 118 (1951).
The amendment did not change the quoted portion of the statute. See note 45 infra.
' Ohio allows for the admission upon appeal of additional evidence, if newly discovered, and such evidence is to be introduced in the reviewing court. § 154-73.
See note 26 supra.
151 Oho St. 222, 85 N.E.2d 113, oral hearing den ed, 89 N.Y.2d 615, 55 Ohio L
Abs. 282, appeal dismissed, 152 Ohio St. 492 (1949). The court of appeals had
held that the reviewing court should have weighed the evidence, stating: "The failure of the Court to give the case his independent judgment violated a substantial
right of the appellant." Farrand v. State Medical Board, 81 N.E.2d 279, 52 Ohio L.
Abs. 552 (1948).
"151 Ohio St. 222, 225, 85 N.E.2d 113, 114 (1949). The provision for admission of new evidence is also found in § 154-73. Apparently this construction embodied the legislative intent for no amendment was made to this portion of the
statute.
" 151 Ohio St. 222, 224, 85 NX.2d 113, 115 (1949).
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in accordance with the statutes appropriate to the proceeding before the
administrative tribunal!"

The strict view of the Farranddecision has been applied several times
by the lower courts of Ohio. 8 The case of Herrhbergerv. Oho Avtatton
Board,"9 a common pleas decision, illustrates the implications of the Farrand doctrine as employed by these courts. In that case it was held that the
reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment if there is any evidence m
the record supporting the agency adjudication, and the court found that a
presumption of the regularity of the proceedings of a town council was
sufficient "evidence" to require affirmance.
Before the stringent Farranddoctrine was announced, the several lower
courts which considered the scope of the review accorded by Section 15473 had arrived at a more liberal view. 40 And some reluctance has been
shown on the part of some of these courts to accept the Supreme Court's
view.4 ' For example, a court of appeals has recently stated that the reviewing court is to decide whether the agency decision is "against the manifest
weight of the evidence,"4 2 indicating that the court is to weigh the evidence
in the record.48

The legislature has now shown its disapproval of the Farranddoctrine. "
151 Ohio St. 222, 226, 85 N.E.2d 113, 115 (1949).
"Meyer v. Dunifon, 88 Ohio App. 246, 94 N.E.2d 471 (1950); Shearer v. State
Medical Board, 97 N.E.2d 688, 58 Ohio L. Abs. 561 (C.App. 1950); Hershberger
v. Ohio Aviation Board, 88 N.E.2d 285, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 374 (C.P. 1949); Sanders
v. Fleckner, 98 N.E.2d 60, 59 Ohio L. Abs. 135 (C.App. 1950), appeal dismassed,
155 Ohio St. 433, 99 N.E.2d 182 (1951).
The harshness of the Farranddoctrine is underscored by the fact that prior decisions hold that the appeal granted by § 154-73 is exclusive. State ex rel. Stein
v. Sohngen, 147 Ohio St. 359, 71 N.E.2d 483 (1947) (mandamus will not lie to
correct an error appealable under § 154-73); State ex rel. Shumaker v. Board of
Embalmers, 69 N.E.2d 376, 46 Ohio L. Abs. 556 (C.App. 1946) (same).
' 88 N.E.2d 285, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 374 (C.P. 1949).
'Toth v. Board of Liquor Control, 84 N.E.2d 256, 54 Ohio L. Abs. 22 (C.P. 1948)
(court must give independent judgment to the record in an appeal under § 154-73);
see Iz re Gram, 86 N.E.2d 48, 50, 53 Ohio L. Abs. 470, 473 (C.P. 1948) ("The
court then determines the appeal de novo on the record certified to it.

").

See

Farrand v. State Medical Board, 81 N.E.2d 279, 52 Ohio L Abs. 552 (C.App.
1948), rev'd, 151 Ohio St. 222, 85 N.E.2d 113 (1949); Sanders v. Fleckner, 98
N.E.2d 60, 59 Ohio L. Abs. 135 (C.App. 1950), appeal dismssed, 155 Ohio St.
433, 99 N.E.2d 182 (1951).
"Shearer v. State Medical Board, 97 N.E.2d 688, 58 Ohio L. Abs. 561 (CApp.
1950).
"Id. at 690.
'The court was of the opinion that the Parrandrule would certainly be difficult
to apply in a case in which the reviewing court admitted and heard new evidence.
97 N.E.2d 688, 691 (1950).
"The impetus to revise § 154-73 apparently came from the Ohio State Bar Association Committee on Administrative Law and Procedure, which vehemently attacked
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The General Assembly has amended the penultimate clause of Section
154-73, so that the clause now reads:
The court may affirm the order of the agency complained of in the appeal if it finds, upon consideration of the entire record and such other additional evidence as the court may have admitted, that the order is supported by reliable, probative and substantal evdence and is in accordance
with law. In the absence of such a finding by the court, it may reverse,
vacate or modify the order or make such other ruling as, in its opinion, is

supported by reliable, probative and substantal evidence and is in accordance with law.'

[Emphasis supplied].

This new provision brings Ohio's act into agreement with the procedure
provisions of a majority of the other states discussed. 48 It is therefore apparent that no rule of Ohio procedure as to judicial review can be stated
until the courts pass upon the amended act, and it is equally dear that
several courses are open to the Supreme Court when it does decide the issue.
It appears that the General Assembly intended, by its amendment of
Section 154-73, to allow the reviewing court to weigh the evidence in the
record independently.4 It is possible, however, that the legislature will still
have the problem of clearly establishing the powers of the reviewing court
For under Section 154-73 in its present form, the Ohio Supreme Court may
still limit the scope of judicial review as under the Farrandcase.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The confusion arising under these acts illustrates the need for a dearly
phrased statutory provision for appeal from administrative adjudications.
Enlightened legislation is the only solution. Among the more important
considerations which should affect such legislation are the powers to be entrusted to administrative agencies, the different functions and methods of
the several agencies to be governed, and the burden to be placed upon the
courts. It is the writer's opinion that while some judicial review of administrative action should be allowed, the "de novo' inquiry allowed in
some states is impracticable. It serves no useful purpose, provided faith can
be accorded the competence of the tribunal, and it tends to clutter the courts
with litigation originally referred to agencies to avoid burdening the courts.
Whether Ohio will continue to have a problem as to the scope of review
remains for the courts to decide. If the General Assembly does in the
future find it again necessary to redefine the scope of review, it is suggested
the Parranddecision in a report to the Bar Association. See 23 Ohio Bar 603 (Oct.
16, 1950).
'5124 Oluo Laws ___, effective August 28, 1951. The penultimate clause formerly
read: "The court may affirm, reverse, vacate or modify the order of the agency com-

plained of in the appeal.
"
" See note 10 supra.
'This is indicated by the Bar Association Committee Report, note 44 supra.

